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Abstract 
Islamic banks, as their charters require, should share their profits 
and losses with their customers through equity financing; but they 
do mark-up financing instead, which is similar to bank loans. 
Theoretically, one of the reasons is Islamic banks operate in poor 
contracting environments where equity financing is very risky. 
Using fixed effects models, we examine what Islamic banks do 
when the countries they are in reform their economies. We do not 
find better contracting environments induce Islamic banks to do 
more equity financing, which suggests that Islamic banks are 
unlikely to shift from mark-up to equity financing in the near 
future—they  are likely to remain similar to conventional banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic banks, as their charters require, should share their profits and losses 
with their customers through equity financing (such as musharakah and 
mudarabah), but they do not—most of their assets are mark-up financing 
(murabahah), which is similar to bank loans.
1
 Islamic banks should do profit 
and loss sharing because their transactions must be free of interest; they should 
not do mark-up financing, which may invite backdoor interest (Siddiqi, 1983; 
Khan and Mirkhor, 1987).
2
 In practice, however, Islamic banks do not differ 
from conventional banks (Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010; Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000). For example, Islamic banks in Malaysia (whose Islamic 
financial market is perhaps one of the most developed) have less than one 
percent of their assets as equity financing (Chong and Liu, 2009). Among 
three large Islamic banks in 2006, Al Rajhi Bank, Bank Islam Malaysia, and 
Dubai Islamic Bank, only the third has some equity financing (14 percent) 
while the first two have equity financing close to zero percent (Khan, 2010). 
One of the reasons is Islamic banks operate in economies where doing 
business is difficult (enforcing contracts, resolving insolvencies, and 
                                                          
1
 In musharakah projects, banks and entrepreneurs invest money and expertise;  in 
mudarabah projects, banks invest only money while entrepreneurs only their 
expertise; in murabahah  projects, banks buy goods that entrepreneurs need and resell 
them to the entrepreneurs at some mark up. See Chapra (1992) and Kuran (1995, 
2005) on debate over the principles of Islamic finance.  
2
 Mark-up financing is permissible, but according to Islamic banks’ charters, Islamic 
banks should try to avoid it. 
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protecting investors are time-consuming, complicated, and costly), which 
makes equity financing very risky.
3
 Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), for 
example, theoretically show that Islamic banks, when they are in poor 
contracting environments that lead to severe agency problems between banks 
and entrepreneurs, will rationally do mark-up financing so that debt-like 
instruments dominate their assets. Because most Islamic banks are in Muslim-
majority countries, which are also developing countries whose quality of 
government institutions and contracting environments are poor, perhaps these 
banks find equity financing both less profitable and too risky. 
 In this paper we examine whether Islamic banks do more equity 
financing when the countries they are in improve their contracting 
environments. Will Islamic banks extend more equity financing when they 
find it easier and cheaper to enforce contracts or resolve insolvency? As the 
countries where the banks are in reform their economies, will the growth of 
equity financing be sufficiently high so that Islamic banks begin to differ from 
conventional banks? These questions are important not only because Islamic 
banking grows fast and helps develop financial markets in muslim countries 
(Gheeraert, 2014; Beck et al., 2013; Khan, 2010), but also because regulators 
need to know how different Islamic banks from other banks are to decide 
whether they need to regulate Islamic banks differently. 
 Using fixed effects models, by controlling for country- or bank-
specific time-invariant variables and year fixed effects that may affect both 
                                                          
3
 See Abdul-Rahman et al. (2014) and Khan (2010) for a discussion of other reasons. 
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contracting environments and equity financing, we do not find better 
contracting environments induce Islamic banks to extend more equity 
financing. (In some specifications, we also control for country-specific time 
trends or country-year fixed effects; the results are robust.) Almost all 
estimates are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
The literature shows that Islamic banks resemble conventional banks; 
we contribute to the literature by showing that, in the near future, they are 
likely to remain similar to conventional banks. As far as we know, we are the 
first who empirically examine whether contracting environments affect 
Islamic banks’ equity financing.  
 We proceed as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the empirical 
strategy and data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Empirical starategy 
We estimate the effects of contracting environments on Islamic banks’ equity 
financing using fixed effects models as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖/𝑗 + 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where yijt is the proportion of equity financing in total assets of bank i in 
country j at time 𝑡, envjt is a measure of contracting environments of country j 
where the Islamic banks operate at time t, i/j  is bank- or country fixed effects, 
t  is year fixed effects, and 𝜀 is the error terms. The country fixed effects 
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control for both observed- and unobserved country-specific characteristics that 
may affect both contracting environments and the dependent variable (such as 
muslims’ view of Islamic banking in a country, governments’ regulation of 
Islamic banking, or governments’ commitment to economic reform) to the 
extent that they are time-invariant during the period of analysis. The bank 
fixed effects control for bank-specific characteristics (in addition to country-
specific characteristics) such as the banks’ preferences towards equity 
financing or their managers’ expertise in equity financing.4 The year fixed 
effects control for worldwide shocks that may affect all banks in each year 
such as global economic growth or innovations in Islamic finance.  
 The estimates of 𝛽 in Equation (1) may be biased because it omits 
time-varying bank characteristics such as whether managers of a bank change 
their policies on equity financing over time or some governments change 
banking regulation or monetary policies. Therefore, to allow banks to follow 
different time trends of these variables, we also estimate the following model:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
where 𝛿𝑖 is a bank-specific trend coefficient and 𝑡 is a time-trend variable. 
Equations (1-2) look restrictive, but they are sufficiently good because 
we are interested in only the coefficient of contracting environments. We 
could include bank time-varying characteristics such as banks’ profits, 
                                                          
4
 We can include either bank- or country fixed effects in a regression because each 
bank operates in one country only. 
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deposits, total assets, or non-performing assets, but these variables and the 
dependent variable, the proportion of equity financing, are likely to be 
endogenously determined, which means specifications that include these bank 
time-varying variables may have biased estimates. To avoid these endogeneity 
problems, we, therefore, prefer to estimate Equations (1-2) without bank time-
varying independent variables. The specifications may suffer from omitted-
variable-bias problems, but we also allow banks to have different time trends 
in some specifications to capture the possibility that each bank may differ in 
some characteristics over time, albeit in a limited way.
5
 
 In some specifications, we include country-year fixed effects as a set of 
control variables that capture country-specific time-varying variables that may 
affect contracting environments and the proportion of equity financing such as 
changes in governments’ regulation of Islamic banks or changes in country-
specific charters of Islamic banks. We estimate the following model:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
where 
𝑗𝑡
 is the country-year fixed effects. 
If better contracting environments induce Islamic banks to extend more 
equity financing, we expect the coefficient of env in Equations (1-3) to be 
positive. 
                                                          
5
 Short of using instrumental variable techniques or regression discontinuity designs, 
Equations (1-2) are perhaps the best specifications to estimate the effects of 
contracting environments on the proportion of equity financing. 
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3. Data 
We get data on the proportion of equity financing from the Bankscope and 
contracting environments from the World Bank’s Doing Business.6 We 
include Islamic banks whose breakdown of assets by type of financing is 
available and Islamic banks that operate in countries whose measures of 
contracting environments are available in the World Bank’s Doing Business. 
We have a sample of 34 Islamic banks over the 2004-2011 period in seven 
countries (Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates), all are Muslim-majority- and developing countries. 
We define a bank’s proportion of equity financing as the ratio between 
the bank’s amount of equity financing and its total financing. We categorize 
mudarabah and musharakah as equity financing and all others (such as 
murabahah and ijarah) as non-equity financing, most of the latter are 
murabahah or mark-up financing. 
We use aggregate measures of the World Bank’s Doing Business as the 
measures of contracting environments in our basic specifications, though we 
also use individual measures in some specifications. We use only measures 
that are relevant to contracting environments: resolving insolvency, getting 
credits, enforcing contracts, and starting a business.
7
 Each aggregate measure 
                                                          
6
 The data are available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/, which we access on 3 
November 2014. 
7
 We use getting credits as a measure of contracting environments because it includes, 
among others, strength of legal rights and credit bureau coverage. 
8 
 
has a value between zero and one hundred; it is the distance between a country 
to the “frontier”, the best performing country in that measure across all 
countries and years whose data are available in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business. For example, a country whose score of resolving insolvency is 30 
means the country is very far away from the frontier, 70 percentage points 
away from the best performing country, Japan. The aggregate measure of 
resolving insolvency incorporates, among others, the time it takes to resolve 
insolvency, its cost, and its recovery rate.
8
 Getting credits includes the strength 
of legal rights, depth of credit information, credit registry coverage, and credit 
bureau coverage. Enforcing contracts includes the time and the costs it takes to 
enforce contracts and the number of its procedures. Starting a business 
includes the number of procedures, time, and cost of starting a business and 
the minimum paid-in capital. 
Table 1, which presents the summary statistics of key variables, shows 
that most of the Islamic banks’ assets are mark-up financing and the 
contracting environments they operate in are very poor. Islamic banks in the 
sample have on average less than ten percent equity financing out of their total 
assets. Resolving insolvency in these seven countries is on average 67 
percentage points away from the best performing country in resolving 
insolvency (Japan), 54 percentage points away from the United Kingdom in 
getting credits, 49 percentage points away from Singapore in enforcing 
                                                          
8
 See the World Bank’s Doing Business for the definitions of the measures of 
contracting environments. 
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contracts, and 33 percentage points away from New Zealand in starting a 
business. Individual measures of contracting environments are also very poor 
(we do not present the summary statistics for brevity): Average recovery rate 
in insolvency cases is 31 cents on the dollar; only 13 percent adults are 
covered by credit bureau; it takes 616 days to enforce contracts; it costs 30 
percent of income per capita to start a business. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
 
4. Results 
As Table 2 shows, we do not find evidence that better contracting 
environments induce Islamic banks to extend equity financing. (The number in 
each cell is the estimate of 𝛽 in Equation (1) using a measure of contracting 
environments listed in the left column and a set of fixed effects listed at the 
bottom of the table; robust standard errors are in parentheses and square 
brackets, the latter are clustered by bank.) Contracting environments 
negatively correlate with the proportion of equity of financing (column 1), 
they do even after we control for year fixed effects (column 2), but the 
estimates are statistically insignificant when we add country fixed effects 
(column 3) or bank fixed effects (column 4) regardless of the measure of 
contracting environments that we use (resolving insolvency, getting credits, 
enforcing contracts, or starting a business). All estimates except the estimates 
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of enforcing contracts are, in fact, negative, which is not the expected sign if 
better contracting environments increase equity financing (though they are 
statistically insignificant). All estimates in columns 3-4 are not statistically 
significant at all as the large standard errors indicate—the standard errors are 
similar to, if not larger than, the estimates. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 Not only that the estimates in columns 3-4 of Table 2 are statistically 
insignificant, their magnitude is also small. The largest, the coefficient of 
enforcing contract in column 4, is about 0.4, which means ten-percentage-
point increase in the index of enforcing contract (ten percentage point closer to 
the best performing country in contract enforcement) increases the proportion 
of equity financing by only four percentage points. For example, a country like 
Malaysia (whose proportion of equity financing in the sample is two percent 
on average) can have this four percentage point increase by improving its 
contract enforcement so that it becomes as good as Switzerland’s (about 10 
percentage points higher), a feat that no developing country finds it easy to 
achieve. 
 Allowing banks to follow different time trends or adding country-year 
fixed effects as a set of control variables shows similar results (Table 3): 
Contracting environments do not seem to matter. (We present the results of 
regressions with year fixed effects, bank fixed effects, and bank-specific time 
trends or country-year fixed effects only for brevity.)  The estimates in column 
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1 are positive except that of starting a business, as we expect if contracting 
environments matter, but their magnitude is small and almost all are 
statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant estimate in column 
1 is that of resolving insolvency when we use the clustered standard error to 
make statistical inference (statistically significant at five percent level). 
However, it is statistically insignificant when we use heteroscedastic-robust 
standard error, which means that we should not rely too much on the clustered 
standard error to make statistical inference (clustered standard errors should be 
bigger than heteroscedastic-robust ones). When we add country-year fixed 
effects (column 2), we find the estimates are positive, but they are statistically 
insignificant (we present the standard errors under homoscedasticity 
assumption because the heteroscedastic-robust and clustered standard errors 
are smaller). 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
We also estimate Equation (1) using random effects models to check 
whether the estimates of the coefficients of contracting environments are 
statistically significant if we assume contracting environments do not correlate 
with the unobserved heterogeneity. Random effects models are more efficient 
than fixed-effect models if the assumption is satisfied, which means that we 
will have larger power to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of contracting 
environments. 
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Even though we use the more efficient random effects models, we find 
no positive effects of contracting environments on the proportion of equity 
financing (Table 4). (We present clustered standard errors only for brevity.) 
All estimates are negative and two of them are statistically significant. We 
should not take these estimates seriously, however, because the no-correlation 
assumption between contracting environments and the unobserved 
heterogeneity is unlikely to hold. Besides, the magnitude of the estimates is 
small. In any case, even though we consider between-variations of contracting 
environments, not only their within-variations (like we do in Tables 2-3), we 
do not find evidence that better contracting environments increase the 
proportion of equity financing. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Instead of using aggregate measures of contracting environments, we 
also use their individual measures, but, again, we do not find evidence that 
contracting environments matter (Table 5). (For brevity, we present one 
individual measure for each aggregate measure; we choose individual 
measures that are available in most years.) Most estimates are positive, but the 
magnitude of all estimates is small and they are statistically significant with 
standard errors as big as the estimates. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Islamic banks do not seem to increase their equity financing even though the 
economies they are in improve their contracting environments. We find 
positive estimates in some specifications, which indicates better contracting 
environments increase the proportion of equity financing, but some others are 
negative. Almost all estimates are statistically insignificant with standard 
errors as big as the estimates. 
 We offer five explanations why we do not find contracting 
environments matter.
9
 One, mark-up financing is simpler, less risky, and more 
profitable than equity financing so that Islamic banks prefer to extend mark-
financing, not equity financing. Two, contracting environments of the 
countries in our sample may be too poor for equity financing to be profitable; 
with recovery rate of insolvency cases of only about 30 cents of the dollar or it 
takes almost two years to enforce contracts, these Islamic banks cannot not 
afford to extend equity financing. Three, the reforms that the governments of 
countries in our sample have done are probably too modest. We do not rule 
out the possibility that contracting environments matter; perhaps we will see 
some effects if the Muslim-majority countries do major reforms so that they 
are closer to the best performing countries like Singapore and Japan. 
(Developing countries are unlikely to do this in the near future, however, if 
                                                          
9
 See also Khan (2010). 
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history is any guide.) Four, managers of Islamic banks may not have the 
expertise to extend equity financing; they may in the future, in which case 
contracting environments may matter. Five, regardless of how good the 
contracting environments are, equity financing may be too risky for banks 
given that small- and short-term deposits dominate their liabilities. If this fifth 
explanation is true, Islamic banks may never specialize on equity financing, 
they keep extending mark-up financing like they do now.  
It is also possible that we find statistically insignificant results because 
of the lack of power to reject the null hypothesis, which may happen when the 
measures of contracting environments change little from year to another. But, 
we think our basic results are robust because we do not find positive effects of 
contracting environments even when we use random effects models that also 
use variations of contracting environments across countries.  
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine which of these reasons 
is the most important, but (given the contracting environments of the countries 
and the reforms they do) we can perhaps say that Islamic banks are unlikely to 
turn “more Islamic” and increase their equity financing in the near future—
they are likely to remain similar to conventional banks. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics  
  
Key variables   
The proportion of equity financing (percent) 9.3 
 
(14.6) 
Measures of contracting environments (0 to 100) 
 
Resolving insolvency 33.2 
 
(8.6) 
Getting credits 46.3 
 
(25.7) 
Enforcing contracts 51.1 
 
(9.1) 
Starting a business 66.1 
 
(17.7) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the mean; the standard deviations are 
in parentheses. The measures of contracting environments are the 
distance to the best performances (for example, a score of 70 means a 
country is 30 percentage points away from the best performance). The 
sample has 34 Islamic banks in eight countries over eight-year period. 
The number of bank-year observations is 162; the number of country-
year observations varies from 46 to 52. 
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Table 2  
Basic results 
     
Dependent variable: The proportion of equity financing   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Resolving insolvency -0.49 -0.42 -0.06 -0.06 
 
(0.18)** (0.21)* (0.46) (0.17) 
 
[0.35] [0.41] [0.20] [0.13] 
Getting credits -0.17 -0.17 -0.02 -0.07 
 
(0.03)** (0.03)** (0.12) (0.09) 
 
[0.06]** [0.06]** [0.12] [0.11] 
Enforcing contracts -0.77 -0.73 0.29 0.35 
 
(0.10)** (0.11)** (1.89) (0.96) 
 
[0.23]** [0.24]** [1.27] [1.58] 
Starting a business -0.60 -0.76 -0.14 -0.14 
 
(0.15)** (0.20)** (0.15) (0.10) 
 
[0.26]* [0.34]* [0.16] [0.17] 
Fixed effects         
Year 
 
  
Country 
 

 
Bank   
 

Notes: The number in each cell is from a regression of the proportion of 
equity financing in total financing on a measure of contracting 
environments and a set of fixed effects. The number of observations is 
about 144; the adjusted-R-squared varies from 0.1 to 0.8. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors; those in square brackets clustered 
by bank. 
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Table 3  
Regressions that include country-specific time trends or country-year fixed 
effects 
   
Dependent variable: The proportion of 
equity financing 
Bank-
specific time 
trends 
Country-year 
fixed effects 
  (1) (2) 
Resolving insolvency 0.37 0.54 
 
(0.28) {0.36} 
 
[0.17]* 
 
Getting credits 0.14 0.06 
 
(0.09) {0.12} 
 
[0.09] 
 
Enforcing contracts 1.07 0.21 
 
(1.12) {0.38} 
 
[0.98] 
 
Starting a business -0.02 - 
 
(0.08) 
 
 
[0.12] 
 
Notes: The number each cell is from a regression of the proportion of 
equity financing in total financing on a measure of contracting 
environments, year fixed effects, bank fixed effects, and country-specific 
time trends or country-year fixed effects. The number of observations is 
about 144; the adjusted-R-squared is about 0.85. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors; those in square brackets clustered 
by bank; those in curly brackets standard errors under homoscedasticity 
assumption. The estimate of the coefficient of starting a business is very 
small. 
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Table 4  
Random effects models  
  Dependent variable: The proportion of equity financing   
    
Resolving insolvency -0.14 
 
(0.14) 
Getting credits -0.12 
 
(0.06)* 
Enforcing contracts -0.66 
 
(0.23)** 
Starting a business -0.27 
 
(0.21) 
Notes: The number each cell is from a random effects regression of the 
proportion of equity financing in total financing on a measure of 
contracting environments, and year fixed effects. The number of 
observations is about 144; the adjusted-R-squared varies from 0.04-0.32. 
The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by bank. 
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Table 5  
Using individual measures of contracting environments 
 
  Dependent variable: The proportion of equity financing   
    
Resolving insolvency 
 
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.25 
 
(1.49) 
Getting credits 
 
Credit bureau coverage (percent of adults) -0.05 
 
(0.05) 
Enforcing contracts 
 
Time (days) 0.26 
 
(0.24) 
Starting a business 
 
Cost (percent of income per capita) 0.11 
 
(0.12) 
Notes: The number each cell is from a regression of the proportion of 
equity financing in total financing on a measure of contracting 
environments, year fixed effects and bank fixed effects. The number of 
observations is 110; the adjusted-R-squared is about 0.7. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by bank. 
 
 
